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Can There Be an Ideal
Coffehouse?

John Milton as Proponent and Critic of the
Public Sphere
Hadley Griggs

It’s 1711 in a coffeehouse in London. Glasses are clinking,.
pages are rustling, and the burbling of conversation fills the building. People
are holding up newspapers, discussing current events, and debating politics.
Even more people are pouring in, paying a penny for their coffees, and joining
the conversation. Joseph Addison, a writer of the era, explained his relationship
with the coffeehouses in his publication, The Spectator: “I appear on Sunday
nights at St. James’s Coffee House, and sometimes join the little Committee
of Politicks in the Inner-Room, as one who comes there to hear and improve”
(Addison). This may be the character of what Enlightenment scholars have
come to call the “public sphere”: an unprecedented venue for the exchange of
ideas that was born in the Enlightenment era. Jürgen Habermas is a leading
voice on this phenomenon, and in his book, The Structural Transformation of
the Public Sphere, he explains the public sphere as hitting its peak in “lateseventeenth-century Great Britain” (xvii) and defines it as “the sphere of private people come together as a public . . . to engage . . . in a debate over the
general rules governing relations” (27). He also emphasizes the role of rationality, highlighting “people’s public use of their reason” (27). In short, the public
sphere was an arena in which people could come and reason through debates.
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It has claimed to be the rise of free public discourse. But this discourse didn’t
last; scholars also agree that the public sphere fell shortly after its rise. Habermas explains in his book that “tendencies pointing to the collapse of the public
sphere are unmistakable, for . . . its function has become progressively insignificant” (4). Alan Gross suggests a reason behind this shift into insignificance: “It
[is] imperative . . . that [the public sphere’s] history emphasize its unfortunate
turn away from rational debate” (142). Thus, as the public sphere transitioned
into something governed not by rational debate but by irrationality, it became
a petty and insignificant part of Enlightenment discourse.
But the discussion on free public discourse in the Enlightenment era cannot be complete without including the work of John Milton, particularly his
1644 tract to Parliament, entitled Areopagitica. In this pamphlet, Milton argues
for “his country’s liberty . . . within the context of the public realm” (Kolbrener
58). He lauds the strength of free public discourse and damns restrictions on
that discourse. In short, he “deals with the whole problem of . . . intellectual
liberty” (Kendall 445). This pamphlet came at the exact time in history when
the public sphere was just starting to stretch its wings in England, and scholars
are adamant when they say that Milton was “highly conscious” of his historical
moment when writing (Loewenstein 77). Thus, Areopagitica can be used as a
snapshot of England’s public sphere, or at least the early opinions on the sphere.
But Areopagitica, as an optimistic and idealistic view of the public sphere,
paints only half of the picture—it accounts nothing for the sphere’s crumble.
So if the public sphere did indeed crumble, then Areopagitica is just one
piece of the puzzle of Enlightenment views on the sphere. Thus, an inclusion of other works will yield even more fruitful historical criticism of the
Enlightenment’s public sphere—namely, the inclusion of Milton’s great 1667
epic, Paradise Lost. If we view Paradise Lost as it often is viewed—a political
allegory, representational of Milton’s early-Enlightenment moment—we can
see a second iteration of Milton’s view of the public sphere, and this one not
so optimistic. Paradise Lost paints a picture of a public sphere that is riddled
with corruption and emotion; this is a far cry from the idealistic sphere of
Areopagitica and shows a sphere that, far before the peak of Habermas’s “lateseventeenth-century Great Britain,” was already showing signs of failure. Thus,
a pairing of the two works—Areopagitica and Paradise Lost—reveals a more
accurate view of the Enlightenment’s public sphere: a view that begins in 1644
with Areopagitica’s ideal discourse model, and ends in 1667 with Paradise Lost’s
book II debate in Pandemonium. By using these two Milton works as windows
19

Criterion

into Enlightenment sentiments, readers can see the English public’s original
optimism, and then its early disillusionment, with the public sphere—and
therefore the nature of even the budding, early seventeenth-century public
sphere as deeply flawed.

Areopagitica and the Public Sphere
In 1643, Parliament passed the Licensing Order of 1643, which instituted
several pre-publication censorship regulations on England—namely licensing
and registration—and provided for the lawful destruction of offensive books
and imprisonment of offensive writers. Milton was outraged by this order, and
in 1644, published his response to it, entitled Areopagitica; A Speech of Mr. John
Milton for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, to the Parliament of England. On
the surface, this tract is simply a staunchly anti-censorship piece. But if we read
Areopagitica as a promotion of the newly forming public sphere, it becomes
more than an anti-censorship rant; it paints a clear picture of an ideal space for
discussion and participation—in other words, ideal free public discourse, or
the ideal public sphere. If readers pay careful attention to both the context and
content of Areopagitica, they can see Milton’s belief in the public sphere.
First, the context of this pamphlet’s inception and publication illustrates
Milton’s ideal of public discourse. He even calls attention to this fact in the
first paragraph of Areopagitica: “The very attempt of this address . . . and the
thought of whom it hath recourse to, hath got the power within me to a passion.”
(“Areopagitica”). The fact that he saw a problem, in this case, with a government-instituted restriction; the fact that he wrote something in protest of such
a problem; and the fact that he believed that Parliament would view the protest with reason and make the change—all of these point to Milton’s belief in
England’s public sphere. For that, Milton says, is the very reason he is writing:
out of a belief that free public discourse would allow him to have an effect on his
country: giving others “recourse.” Thus, even the existence of Areopagitica was
a testament to the optimistic view of the public sphere’s freedom of discourse.
A second testament to discourse is in the content of the pamphlet, and
it once again highlights his optimistic belief in the public sphere. In the epigraph, Milton quotes Euripides to lay out in simple terms the theme of his piece.
In short, he praises the ability to “speak free” (“Areopagitica”). Then, Milton
specifically outlines the ideal structure of the public sphere: “when complaints
20
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are freely heard, deeply considered, and speedily reformed” (“Areopagitica; A
Speech” 33), and it is within this ideal structure that he says England resides—
no doubt because of the rise of the public sphere as a means of sharing, considering, and resolving complaints. Indeed, scholars recognize Milton’s zeal
as faith in the Enlightenment ideals: “Milton realized, especially after his first,
excited foray into pamphleteering, that the [Enlightenment] was a revolution of
words. . . . Areopagitica, with its sense of the vitalistic power of texts, confirms
and defends the power of words” (Loewenstein 82). Thus, we can see Milton’s
belief in the Enlightenment’s “revolution”: that the public sphere had created
an even footing through words, where a free exchange of ideas could take place
and contribute to the betterment of society.
In the content of Areopagitica, Milton also highlights another key component to free discourse: that of reason. Later in his work, Milton explains the origin of man’s reason: “For those actions which enter into a man . . . God uses not
to captivate under a perpetual childhood of prescription, but trusts him with
the gift of reason to be his own chooser” (“Areopagitica”). Milton uses the word
gift to stress the beneficial nature of reason, but he does more than that by associating the idea of reason with God himself. By saying that God “trusts [man]
with . . . reason,” it is clear that Milton believes firmly that reason is of God, and
therefore is key to a good life on earth; it is an important part in the process
of “[man’s] actions.” Thus, Milton wants readers to understand the structure
of decision-making: first comes reason, then comes action. And when we integrate this idea into Milton’s ideal structure of the public sphere (share, consider,
resolve), we can see that reason would have an important role in every stage.
People must use their reason when presenting their ideas, when listening to
others’ ideas, and when implementing solutions. In this model, man must use
his reason at each step to “be his own chooser.” This idea—that reason should
inform all actions—became a fundamental component in the Enlightenment,
and specifically in the public sphere; scholars consistently extol reason as the
driving force behind the public sphere (Habermas 27; Gross 142). And clearly,
for Milton, reason is an essential component—if not the essential component—
in his ideal public sphere.
When we take a step back and look at this image as a whole, the painting
of the public sphere that Milton paints in Areopagitica is optimistic and idealistic. This idealism shows that the public, or at least the educated thinkers like
Milton, saw this sphere as a promising development—full of the potential to
recognize faults in society and work to reach reasonable, informed consensuses.
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He sees a sphere championed by free public discourse and reason. It is a public
sphere in which he believes that one man’s well-reasoned pamphlet can make
a significant change.

Paradise Lost and the Public Sphere
Milton publishes Areopagitica, and twenty-three years pass. He has time
to watch the public sphere unfold, has time to watch the coffee shops fill up,
and has time to write. Then, in 1667, he publishes arguably his greatest work,
Paradise Lost—a twelve-book epic poem that has been praised by critics since
its publication. Viewing this work through the filter of the public sphere adds a
new layer to previous criticism and can shed a completely different light on the
Enlightenment’s public sphere. The end of book I finds Satan raising a building,
called Pandemonium, for a “great consult” (I.798). Milton describes the building as being “like a Temple,” with “pillars overlaid/With Golden Architrave,”
and a “Roof [of] fretted Gold” (I.713–717). So lavish is Pandemonium that neither “Babylon / Nor great Alcairo” can rival its beauty. Once Pandemonium is
finished, Satan summons all of his demons for a discussion of their plans. Then,
“hundreds and . . . thousands” of demons pour into the building (I.761). Book II
opens with all of the demons inside Pandemonium, preparing to participate in
the “solemn council” by presenting their plans (I.755). Finally, Milton can really
dive into his discussion of the public sphere.
This scene already creates an environment that is a far cry from the accessible, even humble, Enlightenment-era coffeehouses. Whereas in reality, coffeehouses were a single-penny investment, Milton paints Pandemonium as a
palace of wealth. This stark contrast brings to light one of Milton’s great tools:
inversion, or a reversal of the normal order. In the case of book II, this reversal is clear: what is about to transpire is a debate, but it is in hell. This setting
is far from what readers would expect—in fact, they would expect free public
discourse to be carried out in a place like heaven. Milton uses inversion as a
powerful tool throughout the epic. But while readers can interpret this inversion to show the opposite of what is happening in their own world, scholars
like Neil Graves ask us to look at it differently: “In his daring epic Milton . .
. aligns paradoxically incongruous characters. The effect is so uncomfortable
that most critics have ignored or dismissed the resulting implications . . . and
have thereby failed to perceive Milton’s subtle criticism” (174). In short, Graves
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is describing Milton’s ability to invert readers’ expectations and thereby show
shocking parallels between the two things he is comparing. Thus, the effect of
Milton’s “paradoxical” alignment in the epic is to highlight the striking similarities between two seemingly disparate ideas: for instance, the idea of what is happening in hell, and the idea of what is happening in reality. This inversion, then,
can inform our reading of Paradise Lost’s debate scene and can allow us to view
the epic not as a depiction of just what is happening in hell, but as a depiction
of Milton’s opinions of the real public sphere, years after Areopagitica. Because
before, in Areopagitica, Milton was trumpeting the cause of the exchange of
ideas—in book II of Paradise Lost he is playing a different tune.
On the surface, it is easy to identify similarities between the debate scene
in Paradise Lost and the debate structure Milton puts forth in Areopagitica.
For instance, the idea of discourse is still present in the work. Satan opens the
discussion with the command: “We now debate. Who can advise may speak”
(II.42). What follows in book II is the account of this debate. Four demons
offer solutions: Moloch demands war (II.51–105), Belial recommends inaction
(II.119–225), Mammon asks for peace (II.229–283), and Beëlzebub suggests infiltrating Earth (II.310–378). It appears that discussion happens, that the demons
weigh out each possibility, and that they decide on the best solution. Even the
trappings of democracy are present in the scene: “With full assent / They vote”
(II.388–89). With these superficial details, we could argue that Milton is still
depicting an ideal public sphere, and that he believes that free open discourse
is alive and well during his contemporary moment.
But as the demons press on in their speeches, it is very clear that book II’s
public sphere discourse is flawed in two major ways. First, there’s the issue of
reason and rationality, and we can see this issue with each demon that presents
a plan. Satan is the first to speak; but before he begins, Milton describes his
emotional state as thus:
Satan exalted sat, by merit raised
To that bad eminence; and from despair
Thus high uplifted beyond hope, aspires
Beyond thus high, insatiate to pursue
Vain War in Heav’n, and by success untaught
His proud imaginations thus displayed. (II.5–10)
In this excerpt, we see Satan relying on a wide array of passionate emotions:
“despair,” being “beyond hope,” “insatia[bility],” having “proud imaginations”—
all in four lines. Satan is allowing these emotions to cloud his reason, and thus
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color his speech. Perhaps even more important is Milton’s use of the word
beyond: Satan is “beyond hope” and “aspires / Beyond thus high.” The word
beyond is a word of extremity, connoting the idea of pushing something further.
In this language of extremity, where is the “gift of reason” that Milton talked
about in Areopagitica? Satan’s speech isn’t borne of reasoned information and
rationality—it springs out of his “despair” and shows him losing his grip on that
rationality.
This lack of reason can be seen in several other demons as well: especially
Moloc and Belial. When Moloc speaks “for open War” (II.51), Milton says, “His
look denounced / Desperate revenge” (II.106–107). Rather than describing
Moloc as wanting simply to act, Milton uses the word revenge—a passionate
word. And he pairs with that passion a word of impulse: desperate. Desperation
does not produce rationality; it is, by nature, an emotion of rashness and
extremity. Therefore, Moloc, too, is allowing his rage to overtake his reason.
And alongside Moloc comes Belial. Milton again indicates a lack of reason
when he describes Belial’s speech as “words clothed in reason’s garb” (II.226).
This line is perhaps the clearest critique Milton gives of the debate—that while
those speaking have every semblance of reason about them, it is nothing but a
façade. Thus, when applied to the public sphere, we see Milton’s view, and it is
not an optimistic one: that participators in the public sphere’s discussions are
not relying on “public use of their reason,” as Habermas put it. They instead are
relying on a public use of their passion. When passion, not reason, is behind
every argument, public discourse becomes less of a venue for discussion and
more of an arena for shouting. Therefore, this lack of reason is disrupting the
very core of the public sphere’s free public discourse.
But as the scene stretches on, Milton brings up more issues with the public
sphere than simply its reliance on passion, rather than reason; his second critique has to do with the very foundations of free speech. It starts when Beëlzebub
rises to present his plan to the awaiting audience—because unbeknownst to the
listeners, Beëlzebub’s plan was actually prepared by Satan: “Thus Beëlzebub /
Pleased his devilish Counsel, first devised / By Satan” (II.378–380). Beëlzebub
speaks about traveling to the Earth and tempting man, all under the guise of
presenting this plan as his own invention, while Satan looks innocently on—
appearing not as a tyrannical leader, but as a democratic guide. Finally, when
the plan is delivered, Satan leads another show of democracy: “With full assent
/ They vote” (II.388–89). And, of course, the demons vote in favor of Satan’s
plan, presented from Beëlzebub’s lips. Satan then begins to speak, praising the
24
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demons for their great implementation of reasonable democracy: “Well have
ye judged,” he says, “well ended long debate” (II.390). But there was no debate;
Satan had engineered the meeting to seem democratic, but he knew the outcome all along. He knew his plan was going to be the choice. Everything was
completely predetermined. And this bleak lack of democracy brings the question: how, in this public sphere, can Areopagitica’s free speech even exist? When
the ideal public sphere is based on “when complaints are freely heard, deeply
considered, and speedily reformed,” how can this perversion of that structure
even be called free public discourse? The fact is this: it is not true public discourse. The picture that Milton paints in Paradise Lost is a harsh commentary
on the nature of free speech in the public sphere: the sphere is dominated by
one central figure that claims to be using the free public discourse model, but
is truly just a tyrant. And perhaps the most crushing aspect of the model in
Paradise Lost is the fact that the audience has no idea; the demons believe they
are involved in the decision-making process of their world, when really their
discussion was just wasted breath. Whether Milton intends Satan to represent
Parliament (who, after Areopagitica was published, rejected Milton’s plea to
repeal the Licensing Order of 1643), a despotic ruler, or a controlling dogma,
this final piece shows Milton’s cynicism: that free speech, in his Enlightenmentera moment, is an illusion.
Looking at the public sphere now through the lens of Paradise Lost, we can
see the whole picture. What started out as hopeful idealism in Areopagitica
turned into disillusionment in Paradise Lost. Whereas before, we could only
see the “intellectual liberty” (Kendall 445) of the public sphere, now we see
“the unfortunate turn” (Gross 142) into irrationality and futility. Thus, Milton’s
critique shows a public sphere marred by passionate zealousness and predeterminism; Paradise Lost is evidence that the writers and philosophers, in just
twenty-odd years of the early Enlightenment, were not as impressed with the
function of the public sphere as they had been in the beginning. It had already
begun to show its flaws, even before its peak.

Conclusion: John Milton and
a Glimmer of Hope
The pairing of Areopagitica and Paradise Lost gives readers a more accurate window into the Enlightenment, and by using these, we can chronicle
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something of the rise and early fall of the public sphere. Paradise Lost leaves
a cynical view of public discourse because while critics like Habermas argue
that the public sphere hit its peak in the eighteenth century, Milton’s picture
depicts a failure in as early as 1667. And what’s more, we are even left with a
bleak outlook on free speech in general. We see a world in which people may
think they are voicing their opinions to an eager audience, when in fact the
entire conversation is rigged.
But is there a glimmer of hope? I argue that there is. Because while Milton’s
Paradise Lost depicts a public sphere in complete disarray, there is one thing
that may hint that Milton had not given up: the fact that he wrote the epic
poem in the first place. If he still saw value in presenting a critique of his historical moment, perhaps that shows he still thought that the exchange of ideas
had value. Perhaps, instead of a complete failure, Milton thought that there
was still a chance that the world could be changed. So while coupling the works
may provide the most accurate representation of the Enlightenment’s historical
moment, perhaps the coffeehouses were not as hopeless as Paradise Lost makes
them out to be. It could still be that sitting in a coffeehouse in London—with
its clinking glasses, rustling pages, and burbling conversation—yielded some
fruitful interaction after all.
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